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Did NEPA Drown New Orleans? The Levees, The Blame Game,
and the Hazards of Hindsight
Thomas O. McGarity and Douglas A. Kysar

I. Introduction
“There are only two kinds of levees, those that have failed and those that
will fail.”1
The failure of the New Orleans levees to prevent waters from Lake Pontchartrain,
Lake Borgne and the Gulf of Mexico from flooding the city during Hurricane Katrina led
to one of the worst disasters in this country’s history. Although many other causes for
the human suffering and economic loss that followed in the wake of Katrina have been
identified and debated, no one disputes the causal connection between the flooding and
the failure of the levees. Had the levees been differently designed, constructed, and/or
maintained, the flooding would not have occurred. The critical question of why the
levees failed, however, has generated considerable disagreement. Although the casual
observer might assume that this is a primarily a question for engineering experts, a
complete answer may also require a careful reconstruction of the planning history of the
levee system and of the role that federal budgetary policy, environmental litigation, and
other public policy developments played in the system’s complex evolution.
In the heated political aftermath of Katrina, the analysis has been further
complicated by the perhaps unavoidable tendency of participants in public policy debates
to conflate causation with fault and to play the “blame game.” Prominently featured in
Katrina’s immediate political aftermath was the claim that the levee system would have
protected New Orleans had local fishermen and an environmental group not filed a
lawsuit in the late 1970s under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 In
particular, critics argue that because a federal district court responded to this suit by
enjoining the levee project pending the preparation of an adequate environmental impact
statement (EIS), the United States Army Corps of Engineers ultimately abandoned its
original design for the New Orleans levees and adopted instead an alternative design that
is said to have been less capable of protecting the city from the storm surge created by
Katrina. In other words, some commentators contend that, as a result of the lawsuit, the
Corps redesigned the project in a way that failed to protect the city.
This Article will evaluate the claim that the 1970s environmental lawsuit
caused—in any meaningful sense—the destruction of New Orleans in 2005. Although
correct answers to many engineering questions are critical to this analysis, the Article will
not attempt to resolve those technical questions. It will rely instead on preliminary
reports produced by various groups of engineers that have analyzed the failures of
particular levees. The Article will also avoid to the extent possible other socio-political
1

Ass’n State Floodplain Managers, Hurricane Katrina & Rita: Using Mitigation to Rebuild a
Safer Gulf Coast, Sept. 9, 2005 (reporting common saying among U.S. Army Corps of Engineers staff).
2
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explanations for the levee failures that were featured in the post-Katrina blame game,
such as the failure of the current and past Administrations to request sufficient
appropriations to build and maintain levees and the role played by alleged
mismanagement within the special New Orleans levee districts.3 Focusing exclusively on
the environmental lawsuit claim, this Article will attempt to probe at a deeper level the
difficulty of retrospective analysis in the hope that the discussion might prove helpful to
those who are examining not only the levee failures, but those other potentially
contributing causes as well. Just as the “lawsuit that drowned New Orleans” turns out to
be oversimplified and misleading, other attempts to pin responsibility for the Katrina
levee failure on any single act or omission are likely to obscure the broader lessons of the
tragedy.
In that respect, scrutinizing the role of the NEPA lawsuit in Katrina levee failures
also sheds some important light on the challenges facing government disaster policy from
the forward-looking perspective. The same problems of uncertainty and complexity that
confound the attempt through hindsight to attribute causal responsibility for a disaster
also confound the attempt to predict through foresight the variety of outcomes, including
potentially disastrous ones, which may flow from policy choices. Thus, in order to guard
against catastrophic potentialities in the future—whether of economic, environmental, or
human loss—one must keep firmly in mind not only the hazards of hindsight, but also the
foibles of foresight.
The next Part of this Article provides both a detailed historical reconstruction of
the decision process that eventuated in the New Orleans storm surge protection system—
including the relevant litigation brought against the Corps of Engineers by various local
interests including the environmental action group Save Our Wetlands4—and an analysis
of how and why Katrina overcame that system. Part III then uses tort law’s “but for”
causation doctrine to introduce the blame game that has been played post-Katrina by
policy-makers, politicians, and various others. Part IV considers in depth the
counterfactual scenario of the New Orleans levee planning absent the NEPA lawsuit in
order to construct a hindsight analysis if the likely causal role played by Save Our
Wetlands in the flooding of New Orleans. Lessons about forecasting risk and
appropriately preparing for future calamities are drawn from the foregoing analysis in
Part V. Concluding thoughts are offered in Part VI.

II. History of the Levee System
Because New Orleans is situated in the delta formed at the mouth of the
Mississippi River, it has long maintained a flood control system to protect it from the
risks of flooding from the Mississippi River to the south, Lake Pontchartrain to the north,
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See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, this issue (observing numerous pre-Katrina warnings of the inadequacy
of the existing storm surge protection system and noting that “[n]otwithstanding these warnings, federal
funding of the New Orleans’ levees dropped by 50% over the past four years”); Andrew Martin & Andrew
Zajac, Flood-Control Funds Short of Requests, Chicago Tribune, September 1, 2005, at 7.
4
Save Our Wetlands v. Rush, Civ. No. 75-3710, Slip Opinion (E.D. La. 1977).
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and Lake Borgne and the Gulf of Mexico to the east.5 The levee system that surrounded
New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina provided by far the most sophisticated and
powerful protection in the city’s long history. Katrina demonstrated, however, that an
even more sophisticated and powerful flooding and storm surge protection system will be
needed to protect the city in the future. In particular, because of its unique topographical
setting, the City of New Orleans will always be at risk from a catastrophic failure of the
levee systems that have grown up around it, if levees are to remain the city’s primary
form of defense. Indeed, the risk will only increase as the city continues to subside and
the protective wetlands between it and the Gulf of Mexico continue to diminish.6
In addition to its Gulf storm surge protection projects, the Corps of Engineers also
designed and constructed the levee system that protects New Orleans from periodic
Mississippi River flooding that typically occurs during springtime. The risk of flooding
from the Mississippi River stems largely from flood waters moving down the river as a
result of rainfall events that may take place hundreds of miles to the north of the city.
The primary line of defense against river flooding is an extensive system of levees and
dikes that extends along the length of the river as it flows through Louisiana. That
system, which contains the city’s highest levees, averaging 25 feet above sea level in
height, was not involved in the Hurricane Katrina disaster.7 Although one misinformed
participant in the blame game following the Katrina disaster erroneously attributed the
New Orleans flooding to an environmental lawsuit involving the Mississippi River levees
(200 miles upstream, no less),8 most of the critical attention to environmental litigation in
the wake of Katrina has focused instead on the levee system that protects New Orleans
from sea storm surge. Unlike the Mississippi River flood protection system, those levees
did not perform during Katrina as they were designed to do. Accordingly, the discussion
hereafter will focus exclusively on the levees, rather than the Mississippi River flood
protection system.
Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne are located side-by-side to the north and
northeast of the city and are separated by a narrow strip of land that allows water to flow
between the lakes through two narrow passes northeast of the city at the Rigolets and
Chef Menteur (see figure 1).9 While Lake Borgne is separated from developed areas of
the city by a large area of open swampland, Lake Pontchartrain immediately borders the
downtown and western parts of the city.10 The primary flood risk from the lakes occurs
in the late summer and fall during tropical storms and hurricanes. Surges in Lake
Pontchartrain pose the greatest risk to the downtown area, and surges in Lake Borgne
primarily threaten New Orleans East and St. Bernard Parish to the east of the downtown
area. An interconnected series of levees protects the city from storm surges in the lakes.
5

R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 1-2; Mark Fischetti, Drowning New
Orleans, Scientific American, October 1, 2001.
6
Fischetti, supra note ___, at [page].
7
Bob Marshall, Levee System Along River Held Its Ground in Storm, Times-Picayune, Jan. 23,
2006.
8
R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr., Eco-Catastrophe Echoes, Washington Times, September 16, 2005
9
A map of the lakes and levees prepared by the New Orleans Times-Picayune staff can be found
at http://www.nola.com/hurricane/popup/nolalevees_jpg.html.
10
R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 1-2.
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These levees are considerably smaller than the ones that line the Mississippi River,
ranging from 13.5 to 18 feet above sea level in height.

Because much of the land mass of New Orleans is below sea level and continues
to sink, rainwater that flows into the city must be removed not by natural drainage, but by
huge pumps that force the water to move northward along three man-made canals, called
“outfall” or “drainage” canals, into Lake Pontchartrain. Named for the streets that they
parallel (17th Street, London Avenue, and Orleans Avenue), the canals are lined with
levees and concrete floodwalls that prevent the water from spilling into the city.11 In
some places, water flowing through the canals is nearly as high as the rooftops of houses
in the surrounding neighborhoods.12 All of the levees were built by contractors working
for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and, like all of the levees protecting the city, are
maintained by various local levee districts.13
In addition to the drainage canals, the Corps of Engineers during the twentieth
century constructed three large and interconnected “navigation” canals to permit ocean11

R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 2-1.
12
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13
Id.
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going vessels to move from the Mississippi River through the city north to Lake
Pontchartrain, northeast to the Intercoastal Waterway that connects ports along the entire
Gulf Coast, and south to the Gulf of Mexico. The Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (often
referred to by the local population as the “Industrial Canal”) slices north/south across the
city between the river and Lake Pontchartrain at the point where they are closest to each
other. The Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO) canal bisects the Industrial Canal at
right angles and travels east/west to a point in St. Bernard Parish where it forms a “Y”
with the Intercoastal Waterway. From the Y, the Intercoastal Waterway moves to the
northeast and the MRGO Canal continues in a southeasterly direction to the Gulf of
Mexico.14 Like the outfall canals, the shipping canals are all confined by earthen levees
and concrete floodwalls.
The levee systems effectively divide the city and surrounding developed areas
into four large protected basins called “polders,” each of which is protected by its own
perimeter levee system.15 Thus, the land within one polder can flood while the land
remaining within other polders remains protected. In the devastating Katrina flood,
however, levees in all of the polders failed, and some or all of the land within each was
flooded. Land located in the crescent bordering the Mississippi River at the south end of
the downtown area is above sea level and therefore was not flooded.
A. Levee Planning and Construction History
The system just described grew out of a reevaluation of the protections that had
failed when Hurricane Betsy struck New Orleans in September 1965. Reacting to the
devastating flooding which resulted from that storm, Congress authorized a massive
hurricane protection improvement effort called the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity
Hurricane Protection Project (LPVHPP) to provide hurricane protection to all of the
Greater New Orleans metropolitan area.16 To implement this statute, the Corps of
Engineers carefully studied two major options—the “high level” option and the “barrier”
option.
1. The “High Level” and “Barrier” Options.
The “high level” option consisted simply of raising all of the existing levees and,
where necessary, constructing new levees to a height that would prevent flooding that
could result from the standard project hurricane (SPH), a hypothetical hurricane that was
used to guide Corps levee design and that loosely represented the most extreme hurricane

14

John Schwartz, Competing Plans to Repair New Orleans Flood Protection, New York Times,
January 22, 2006, at A18.
15
R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 1-3. The word “polder” is a Dutch word
that means “a contiguous land unit protected by a perimeter levee system.” Id.
16
Hearings on Hurricane Protection Plan for Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity before the
Subcommittee on Water Resources of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 House Hearings], at 20 (testimony of Colonel Early J.
Rush III). See also GAO, Hurricane Protection: Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee
Maintenance and Emergency Response for the Lake Pontchartrain Project, Dec. 15, 2005, at 4.
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that would be expected to hit New Orleans every 200 to 300 years.17 Although experts
later determined that the model hurricane could not possibly occur in the real world,18 it
was roughly equivalent to a fast-moving Category Three storm on the Saffir-Simpson
hurricane scale.19 In practice, the high level plan for protection against the SPH would
have resulted in raising the levees from between 9.3 and 13.5 feet above sea level to
between 16 and 18.5 feet above sea level.20 The assumption was, of course, that the
levees would be properly designed and constructed to withstand all storm surges that did
not exceed those levels.
Under the “barrier” option, the Corps would have constructed levees along the far
eastern edge of Lake Pontchartrain where it flows into Lake Borgne and ultimately the
Gulf of Mexico through two relatively narrow channels at the Rigolets pass and Chef
Menteur pass (see figure 2). The Corps would also have constructed structures at the two
passes containing massive gates that would have allowed water to flow back and forth
between the lakes but that would have been closed when hurricanes approached.21
Finally, the Corps would have built a navigation lock, rock dike, and gated flood control
structure at the point at which the Industrial Canal enters Lake Pontchartrain. The gates
would have been closed during hurricanes to prevent water from entering the Industrial
Canal from Lake Pontchartrain.22 The Corps believed that the levees and the barrier
structure would prevent storm surge preceding hurricanes from crossing from Lake
Bourne into Lake Pontchartrain.23 Consequently, the levees bordering the city along
Lake Pontchartrain would be fortified, but not significantly raised as under the alternative
plan. Still, like the high level option, the barrier option was designed to protect against
the SPH.24
2. First Choice: The Barrier Option
The high level option had several drawbacks from the perspective of Corps
officials, including the need to obtain rights of way for additional land near the levees to
allow them to be widened and raised. In addition, the high level plan would not have
prevented the flooding of some industrial areas and potentially developable wetlands
17

1978 House Hearings, supra, at 21 (testimony of Colonel Early J. Rush III). For an extended
discussion of the SPH, see infra text accompanying notes __-__.
18
John McQuaid & Mark Schleifstein, Evolving Danger: Experts Know We Face a Greater Threat
from Hurricanes than Previously Suspected, Times-Picayune, June 23, 2002 (“Meteorologists today say the
Standard Project Hurricane could not exist in nature.”) (quoting Louisiana State University engineering
professor Joseph Suhayda).
19
Jerry Mitchell, E-Mail Suggests Government Seeking to Blame Groups, Mississippi ClarionLedger, September 16, 2005, at A1 (quoting Corps of Engineers spokesperson John Hall); John McQuaid
& Mark Schleifstein, Evolving Danger, New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 23, 2002, at J12; See
Government Accountability Office, Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee Maintenance and
Emergency Response for the Lake Pontchartrain Project, Dec. 15, 2005, GAO-06-322T, at page 1.
20
United States General Accounting Office, Cost, Schedule, and Performance Problems of the
Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project (PSAD-76-161 (August 31, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1976 GAO Report], at 3.
21
1978 House Hearings, supra, at 22-24, 33-36 (testimony of Colonel early J. Rush III).
22
1978 House Hearings, supra, at 22-24, 33-36 (testimony of Colonel early J. Rush III).
23
1978 House Hearings, supra, at 22 (testimony of Colonel early J. Rush III).
24
1978 House Hearings, supra, at 22 (testimony of Colonel early J. Rush III).

6

located outside the existing downtown polder between the levees and the lake to the
northeast of the city.25 The Corps therefore decided to implement the barrier option.26
To speed the project along, the Orleans Levee Board financed and constructed portions of
the Industrial Canal floodwalls, and this relatively inexpensive aspect of the project was
virtually completed by 1973.27 Work on the barrier structures and levees running from
New Orleans to the those structures, however, was greatly delayed because landowners
opposed to the project demanded high prices for parcels of property that the Corps
needed in order to construct the levees, forcing the Corps to exercise its power of eminent
domain.28
In 1976, a coalition of local fishermen and an environmental group called Save
Our Wetlands sued the Corps of Engineers alleging that the final environmental impact
statement (FEIS) prepared for the project was inadequate.29 On December 30, 1977, a
federal district court agreed, issuing an injunction that prevented the Corps from
conducting any further work on the barrier project until it had prepared an adequate FEIS.
The injunction was subsequently modified to permit continued construction of the levees
between the lake and the City of New Orleans.30

25

Id. at 21 (testimony of Colonel early J. Rush III).
The Orleans Levee District -- A History, available at http://www/orleanslevee.com/history.htm
[hereinafter cited as Levee District History]
27
Id.
28
1976 GAO Report, supra, at 16.
29
Levee District History.
30
Id.
26

7

3. Second Choice: The High Level Plan
After the injunction issued, the Corps reconsidered the costs and benefits of the
barrier and high level options. It was at that time encountering additional opposition to
the barrier plan from local citizens who did not want to pay a very high price for a project
that might endanger the vitality of Lake Pontchartrain,31 from citizens who saw the
project as “a land grab that would personally enrich some of the civic leaders pushing
hardest for it,”32 and from representatives of areas on the Lake Borgne side of the barrier
who likely would have been placed at greater risk of flooding during hurricanes and who
therefore felt the plan would foreclose economic development of their region.33
The intense public opposition was in evidence during congressional hearings
conducted in New Orleans the week after the injunction issued. A spokesperson for the
League of Women Voters argued that the Corps had never undertaken a study of the cost
to taxpayers of maintaining the urbanization of wetlands that the project envisioned, and
she noted that the voters of New Orleans had defeated proposals to participate in
financing the barrier project on three separate occasions, but had voted to approve a
31

United States General Accounting Office, Cost, Schedule, and Performance Problems of the
Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project (PSAD-76-161 (August 31, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1976 GAO Report], at 3.
32
Carl M. Cannon, The Next Big One, National Journal, September 24, 2005, at 2902, 2907.
33
Carl M. Cannon, The Next Big One, National Journal, September 24, 2005, at 2902, 2907.
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similar project without the barriers the previous year.34 An informal poll conducted by
Representative Robert Livingston indicated that a substantial majority of the New
Orleans citizens either opposed the project (38.5 percent) or favored discontinuation until
the studies could be completed (23.6 percent).35 Although not known for his antipathy to
federally financed public works projects in his district, even Representative Livingston
expressed considerable reservations about the wisdom of this particular project. The state
representative from St. Tammany Parish, part of which was on the Lake Borgne side of
the barrier project, warned that the project would put his parish at risk when the gates
were closed because it would deflect the surge from Lake Borgne into St. Tammany
Parish.36
By 1982, the New Orleans District of the Corps of Engineers had changed its
mind. It now favored the high level plan “because it would cost less than the barrier
plan” and would “have fewer detrimental effects on Lake Pontchartrain’s environment.”37
One of the factors underlying the changed cost assessment was no doubt the escalating
cost of acquiring rights of way from property owners who opposed the barrier project.38
The Corps made a final decision to proceed ahead with the high level plan in 1985.
Although nearly seven years had passed between the issuance of the injunction and the
Corps’ ultimate decision to abandon the barrier plan, the project was substantially
completed prior to Hurricane Katrina.39
B. The Levee Failures
Although the explanation for why the New Orleans levees failed involves a
complex interaction of engineering and policy considerations, the inquiry into what
physically happened to the levees on August 29, 2005 is largely a technical question.
This is not, however, to say that there is an easy explanation for what exactly happened to
the levees that night, and the engineers studying that question will no doubt debate the
finer points of the analysis for years. The description below draws primarily upon the
Preliminary Report of a group of experts from the University of California at Berkeley
and the American Society of Civil Engineers (the “Berkeley/ASCE group”) based upon
its analysis of the situation shortly after the hurricane.40 The Corps of Engineers, a group
from the Louisiana State University Hurricane Canter, and a panel assembled by the

34

1978 House Hearings, supra, at 11 (testimony of Charlotte H. Nelson).
1978 House Hearings, supra, at 12.
36
1978 House Hearings, supra, at 47-48 (testimony of Edward G. Scogin).
37
United States General Accounting Office, Improved Planning Needed by the Corps of Engineers
to Resolve Environmental, Technical and Financial Issues on the Lake Pontchartain Hurricane Protection
Project (GAO/MASAD-82-39 (August 17, 1982), at 2.
38
1976 GAO Report, supra, at 16.
39
Levee District History, supra.
40
R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems
in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005). The description also relies on newspaper
accounts of conclusions of the experts involved in this and other investigations.
35
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National Academy of Sciences are also conducting in depth inquiries that could well
come to different conclusions.41
1. Lake Pontchartrain and the Outfall Canals.
The water that flooded the polder containing downtown New Orleans and the
French Quarter did not flow over the high level levees situated between Lake
Pontchartrain and the city. As previously discussed, these levees were designed to
withstand a hurricane that was roughly equivalent to a fast-moving Category Three
Hurricane, and they did their job. Most of the experts have agreed that by the time it
encountered Lake Pontchartrain, Katrina’s status had decreased from Category Four to
the upper range of Category Three.42 As the surge flowed from Lake Pontchartrain up
the 17th Street, Orleans Avenue and London Avenue outfall canals, it did not overtop the
levees confining those canals either.43 The surge did, however, cause three major
breaches in the 17th Street and London Avenue levees.44 These breaches allowed water
from Lake Pontchartrain to flood wide areas of the downtown polder. In the aftermath of
the storm, the Corps of Engineers stressed that the two specific outfall levees that had
breached were “fully completed” and not on the list of unfunded projects.45
The Berkeley/ASCE group concluded that the levee failure on the east side of the
17th Street canal “appears to have been a stability failure of the foundation soils beneath
the earthen embankment” to which the floodwall was attached.46 The group concluded as
a preliminary matter that the breach on the west bank of the London Avenue canal
“occurred as a result of the sheetpile/floodwall being pushed backwards by the elevated
water pressures on the outboard side, and that support on the inboard side of the
sheetpile/floodwall was reduced as a result of soil failure at or beneath the base of the
earthen levee embankment.”47 According to the group’s report “[e]vidence at both sites
suggests that massive underseepage passed beneath the relatively short sheetpiles, and
this may have weakened the foundation soils beneath the inboard sides of the earthen

41

For more current information, Boalt Hall School of Law maintains a website of regularly
updated information on the Katrina disaster and disasters and the law more generally.
See
http://128.32.29.133/disasters.php.
42
Joby Warrick & Michael Grunwald, Investigators Link Levee Failures to Design Flaws,
Washington Post, October 24, 2005, at A1
43
R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 1-5. See also John M. Barry, After the
Deluge, Some Questions, New York Times, October 13, 2005 (citing the preliminary conclusions of three
post-Katrina engineering studies); Celeste Biever, Flood Walls in New Orleans were “Structurally Flawed,”
New Scientist, September 22, 2005 (quoting Paul Kemp, and oceonologist at the Louisiana State University
Hurricane Center).
44
R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 1-5.
45
Andrew Martin & Andrew Zajac, Flood-Control Funds Short of Requests, Chicago Tribune,
September 1, 2005, at 7.
46
R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 2-3.
47
R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 2-6.
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levee embankments.”48 In other words, the pressure that the storm surge generated from
within the canal caused the weak soil in which the floodwalls were anchored to give way
in some places and pushed the walls backwards into the protected polders.
Consistently with this conclusion, most engineers who have examined the
question have concluded that the underseepage occurred because the floodwalls were not
anchored sufficiently deeply in the foundation soils at the time that they were designed
and built in connection with the implementation of the high level option in the late
1980s.49 The leader of the Berkeley/ASCE group noted that the safety margins employed
in the designs for the levees were far lower than the safety margins employed in most
other critical engineering projects.50 The Corps of Engineers has traditionally employed
a safety factor of 1.3 for levee construction projects, meaning that levees are designed to
withstand pressure approximately one-third again as powerful as expected forces.51
According to documents from the mid-1980s when the high level option was
being implemented along the outfall canals (accounts of which vary somewhat), tests of
the soil below the existing levees encountered a layer of peat some 15-20 feet below the
surface.52 The design for the project called for sinking the pilings 17-20 feet below the
surface.53 Since peat expands and softens when it becomes wet, the pilings should have
been extended sufficiently far beneath the peat to provide adequate stability.54 A team of
experts from Louisiana State University concluded from an examination of historical
documents that the floodwalls built in the 1980s to implement the high level option were
not anchored sufficiently deeply because the soils immediately below the existing levees
consisted of spoil from digging the canals in the late nineteenth century and dredging
them in the early twentieth century.55 This explanation is consistent with documents filed
in litigation during the mid-1990s between the Corps of Engineers and a construction
48

R. B. Seed, et. al, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 (November 2, 2005), at 2-6.
49
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Louisiana State University Hurricane Center).
50
Ralph Vartabedian & Stephen Braun, System Failures Seen in Levees, Los Angeles Times,
October 22, 2005 (quoting Raymond Seed, leader of the Berkeley/ASCE group).
51
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New Orleans Times-Picayune, December 8, 2005.
52
Christopher Drew & John Schwartz, Engineers Point to Flaws in Flood walls’ Design as
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surface)Joby Warrick & Michael Grunwald, Investigators Link Levee Failures to Design Flaws,
Washington Post, October 24, 2005, at A1 (pilings sunk 20 feet below the surface).
54
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Probable Cause of Collapse, New York Times, October 24, 2005 (citing “[s]everal outside engineers); Joby
Warrick & Michael Grunwald, Investigators Link Levee Failures to Design Flaws, Washington Post,
October 24, 2005, at A1 (quoting University of California at Berkeley engineer, Robert Bea).
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company that had been working on the levees. The company claimed that sections of the
floodwalls were failing to line up properly because of unstable underlying soils.56
Although Corps of Engineers officials are not yet persuaded by this explanation, the
design for rebuilding the floodwalls post-Katrina does call for sinking the pilings to a
depth of 40 feet.57
Other evidence suggests that the contractors who were responsible for testing the
soil and building the levees along the outfall canals may have been responsible for poor
construction in places where the levees breached.58 A team of engineers from LSU who
investigated the levee failures at the behest of the State of Louisiana discovered that the
piling extended only 10 feet below sea level in some areas, rather than the 17 foot depth
called for in the design documents.59 Although a Corps of Engineers analysis of the same
pilings rejected this conclusion,60 the LSU scientists are convinced that their assessment
is correct because the measuring equipment that they used is more accurate than the
Corps’ equipment.61 The Berkeley/ASCE group also heard allegations of malfeasance
on the part of contractors in connection with the construction of the levees and “some
field evidence” appeared to “correlate with those stories.”62 Berkeley Engineer Robert
Bea worried that the outside engineering firms and contractors may have been more
concerned with the bottom line than with identifying and correcting problems in the
design and construction of the levees.63 Louisiana’s Attorney General has opened an
investigation into these allegations.64
Finally, the Berkeley/ASCE group concluded that lax maintenance practices may
have contributed to the breach of some of the levees lining the outfall canals.65 For
example, large trees were allowed to grow at the base of some of the levees. According
to one of the engineers conducting the Berkeley/ASCE investigation, the root systems of
56
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the trees could have opened up a pathway for water to seep through a soft layer of peat
beneath the levees and reach the other side, thereby undermining the integrity of the levee
wall.66 In addition, state and local officials have admitted that they typically skipped the
canal floodwalls when they were performing annual levee inspections, and that the levees
they did inspect were given only cursory attention.67 The Corps of Engineers has not yet
agreed with these assessments, and it has instead undertaken an extensive investigation of
the causes of the outlet canal levee failures.68 Nevertheless, the information and analysis
revealed thus far suggests that the outlet canal walls were not overtopped and that the
downtown polder would not have flooded if the walls had withstood the lateral pressure
of the storm surge inside the canals, as they were designed to do.69
2. Lake Borgne
The largest storm surge to hit the New Orleans area came not from Lake
Pontchartrain to the north but from Lake Borgne to the east.70 Although the Corps
enhanced the levees for the polders protecting New Orleans East from Lake Borgne as
part of the high level plan, the estimated 18–25 foot storm surge exceeded the height of
some of the levees protecting that polder by as much as 5–10 feet.71 These levees were
simply not high enough to repel the storm surge, and they were “overwhelmed” and
“massively eroded.”72 Colonel Richard Wagenaar, the Corps’ head engineer for the New
Orleans district, reported that the eastern levees were “literally leveled in places.”73
Large areas in this polder, which was inhabited mainly by low income residents and
businesses that served local communities, were flooded. Since this surge came from
Lake Borgne and not Lake Pontchartrain, it is clear that the barrier project—had it been
constructed during the 1980s—would not have prevented this damage and might even
have exacerbated it by deflecting some portion of the surge from the two passes to the
southern half of Lake Borgne. A protection system more massive in scope that could
have slowed or prevented a storm surge into Lake Borgne—such as the huge seagate
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structures that are utilized to protect the Netherlands from North Atlantic storms74—
might in theory have provided better protection to New Orleans. No such structures,
however, were contemplated as part of the original barrier plan.
3. The Navigation Canals
Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge also proceeded from the Gulf of Mexico and
Lake Borgne up the MRGO Canal to the Industrial Canal in the heart of New Orleans.
The MRGO Canal, which was completed in 1968, is a deep draft seaway channel that
extends for approximately 76 miles east and southeast of New Orleans into Breton Sound
and the Gulf of Mexico. It was designed to shorten the distance for ships traveling from
the eastern shipping lanes of the Gulf to New Orleans, but it has never lived up to its
economic expectations.75 The storm surge overtopped the levees running along these
canals at “a number of locations,” and several breaches occurred.76
A post-Katrina modeling exercise undertaken by the LSU Hurricane Center
concluded that the “funneling” effect of the MRGO Canal, which narrows from 2000 feet
wide where it intersects the Intercoastal Waterway to 200 feet wide where it bisects the
Industrial Canal, intensified the initial storm surge by about 20 percent and increased the
velocity of the surge from three to 6–8 feet per second.77 G. Paul Kemp, an
oceanographer at the LSU Hurricane Center, concluded that the MRGO “funnel” was “a
back door into New Orleans,” and he had little doubt that it “was the initial cause of the
disaster.”78 As a result of these levee failures, large areas of flooding occurred within the
polder containing St. Bernard Parish and the Ninth Ward to the south of the MRGO
Canal and within the polder containing New Orleans East to the north of the MRGO
Canal.79 As with the storm surge from Lake Borgne, the barrier project would not have
protected the two flooded polders from the surge that overtopped and breached the levees
along the MRGO Canal, because no protection systems were contemplated to prevent the
“funneling” effect of the canal.
The levees lining the Industrial Canal experienced a number of much smaller
failures along both of its banks. Several breaches occurred along the eastern bank
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between the MRGO Canal to the south and Lake Pontchartrain to the north.80 These
breaches allowed water to flow to the east into the New Orleans East polder. The levees
along the western edge of the Industrial Canal were breached in three places located
almost directly across from the point at which the MRGO Canal adjoins the Industrial
Canal.81 The Berkeley/ASCE group concluded that “storm surges overtopped numerous
stretches of levees along this Canal frontage.”82 The LSU Hurricane Center’s postKatrina modeling exercise concluded that the enhanced velocity of the storm surge as it
traveled up the MRGO Canal also contributed to the scouring that undermined the levees
along the Industrial Canal.83 These after-the-fact analyses are consistent with the
contemporaneous observations of the lockmaster on the Industrial Canal, who reported to
the Corps of Engineers that the surge reached that canal before dawn and overflowed on
both sides.84 The lockmaster’s observations also cast doubt on the claim that the surge
from Lake Pontchartrain caused the levee failures on the Industrial Canal because,
according to the Corps of Engineers New Orleans Project Manager, the Lake
Pontchartrain surge occurred much later in the morning after the hurricane’s eye had
passed east of the city and winds from the north began to force water to the south toward
the city.85
It is theoretically possible that the overtopping and resultant erosion of the
Industrial Canal levees would have occurred even in the absence of the MRGO Canal
because of the subsequent storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain. However, the
conclusion that the storm surge from the MRGO Canal caused the levee failures along the
Industrial Canal to fail is amply supported by hindsight observations of the Industrial
Canal levees, hindsight recreation of the storm surge using sophisticated mathematical
models, and contemporaneous observations by at least one eye witness. It bears noting,
nevertheless, that as of late October the Corps was reserving judgment on whether the
MRGO contributed to the failure of the Industrial Canal levees in this manner.86

III. The Blame Game
The above description of the complex system of levees that was supposed to
protect New Orleans at the time of Hurricane Katrina suggests that the question posed in
the introduction to this article, “Why did the levees fail?”, is framed too broadly or,
perhaps, too simplistically. In fact, many levees failed in many places for many different
80
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reasons. Some were overtopped by floodwaters that then scoured out the levee support
from inside the protected area. Others could not withstand the direct pressure of the
storm surge from outside the protected area because they were not imbedded sufficiently
deeply in the underlying soils. Some floodwalls may have come apart during the storm
surge because connections between individual wall sections failed. Future investigations
will no doubt uncover still other suggested reasons for the various levee failures that
occurred during the Katrina storm surge.
Because the levee systems divided the city and surrounding areas into polders, the
failure of the levee system protecting one polder did not necessarily contribute to the
damage caused by the failure of the levee system protecting a different polder. Some
areas of the city would not have flooded had one levee system held, even if the others had
failed. Other areas of the city would not have flooded had two levee systems both held,
but would have flooded if either of the two failed. All of these inquiries are essentially
engineering questions and are best answered through detailed field investigations and
complex mathematical modeling exercises. Still, although correct answers to these
questions are relevant to the post-Katrina blame game, they will not by themselves be
sufficient to resolve the broader issues raised by Katrina, including the prominent
contention that NEPA played a causal role in the New Orleans flooding.87
Not long after the damage to New Orleans became apparent, a retired Corps of
Engineers official, conservative pundits, and politicians began a concerted campaign to
blame the damage on a lawsuit brought against the Corps of Engineers in 1976 by local
fishermen and a local environmental group called Save Our Wetlands.88 Citing that
litigation and other clearly irrelevant litigation involving the Mississippi River levee
system far upstream of New Orleans, conservative commentator R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr.
claimed that “[f]or too long, environmentalist fanatics with no sense of a broad-based
commonweal have had a veto over government and private-sector projects essential to the
health and well-being of millions of Americans.”89 A columnist for FrontPage online
magazine referred to the Save our Wetlands litigation as “green genocide.”90 The
chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee asked the Justice
Department to investigate whether any environmental litigation might have played a role
87
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in the New Orleans flooding, and high level officials in that Department circulated an
email to line attorneys asking for information about cases in which they had defended the
Corps of Engineers from environmental claims involving the levees protecting New
Orleans.91 The House Task Force on Improving the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA Task Force”)—already controversial due to its perceived heavy-handedness and
overtly politicized agenda92—decided to add the Save Our Wetlands litigation to its
agenda as it considered possible amendments to NEPA.93
The plaintiffs filed Save Our Wetlands v. Rush94 in 1976, some time after work
had begun on the levees between New Orleans and the passes at the Rigolets and Chef
Menteur, but before work had been initiated on the barrier structures. The plaintiffs
claimed that the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) that the Corps of
Engineers had prepared for the barrier project did not meet the requirements of Section
102 of NEPA in several regards. In particular, they claimed that the FEIS had not
adequately addressed the potential adverse impact of the structures on the normal tidal
flows of water between Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. In their view, the flows
were critical to maintaining the vitality of the Lake Pontchartrain fishery and the overall
integrity of the marine ecosystem.
The district court held that the FEIS was in fact inadequate. It concluded that “the
picture of the project painted in the FEIS was not in fact a tested conclusion but a hope by
the persons planning the project that it could in fact be constructed so as to meet the
environmental objectives set out in the FEIS.”95 The court noted that the chief engineer
for the Corps’ New Orleans Division had requested further model studies because the
studies upon which the draft EIS relied were undertaken more than a decade earlier and
had addressed an obsolete version of the project. The chief engineer feared that the flow
of water between the lakes would be far less in the new version of the project than in the
earlier version. The Corps’ environmental staff initiated the requested model studies, but
they had not completed them when the FEIS came out. Even though more appropriate
studies were on the way, the FEIS continued to rely upon the obsolete studies, and this
unexplained impatience on the part of the Corps clearly troubled the court.96
The court was also troubled by the content of the analysis that the FEIS did
provide and the role of upper level officials in determining that content. The biological
analysis presented in the FEIS relied entirely on a single telephone conversation with a
marine biologist who was asked to speculate about the impact of the project on marine
organisms using the inter-lake flow rates predicted by the obsolete model. The Corps of
Engineers official responsible for preparing the EIS expressed reservations about key
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statements on the effects of the structures on marine life in the lake, and he suggested that
the document’s conclusion that the project “would not” have a significant impact on lake
biology should at least be changed to “should not.” That official, however, was overruled
by his superiors. In addition, the assessment of the barrier project’s benefits included the
benefits of further urban development on wetlands that would be reclaimed from the lake
after the project was completed, but it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
area had also been designated as a protected wetland. A Corps economist had pointed
this out and asked that the analysis be modified accordingly. He, too, was overruled by
upper level officials.97
The court concluded that in light of “the problems of which the Corps was aware
with respect to the possibility of significantly decreased tidal flow through the
structures,” the analysis of alternatives in the FEIS was inadequate. The court concluded
that the FEIS “precludes both the public and the governmental parties from the
opportunity to fairly and adequately analyze the benefits and detriments of the proposed
plan and any alternatives to it.”98 It therefore enjoined further work on the barrier
structures until the Corps had completed an adequate FEIS. The court made clear,
however, that its opinion and order should “in no way be construed as precluding the
Lake Pontchartrain project as proposed or reflecting on its advisability in any manner,”
and it stressed that “[u]pon proper compliance with the law with regard to the impact
statement, this injunction will be dissolved and any hurricane plan thus properly
presented will be allowed to proceed.”99

IV. Hindsight Analysis of the New Orleans Flooding.
The starting point in a hindsight causation analysis is careful historical
reconstruction of the event in question. The analyst must then compare that
reconstruction to a hypothetical scenario in which the act or omission alleged to be the
cause of the consequence at issue did not occur. If, in this alternative state of the world,
the harmful event still occurs, then the suspected act or omission is not a “but-for” cause
of the event.100 Proper hindsight analysis therefore requires both an accurate
reconstruction of the actual history of the event and a persuasive analysis of the
appropriate counterfactual scenario. Of course, such but-for causation analysis by itself
is insufficient for purposes of assigning legal or moral responsibility, given the variety of
other considerations that ultimately must be brought to bear on the situation in order to
move from “but-for” to blameworthiness analysis.101 Nevertheless, the but-for method of
identifying contributing causes does provide a conventional starting point for the ultimate
attribution of responsibility. For post-Katrina NEPA debate, therefore, the first important
question to ask is whether, but for Save Our Wetlands, would the catastrophic flooding of
New Orleans still have occurred? This Part answers that question.
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A. The Lake Borgne and MRGO levee failures
From the engineering analysis related above,102 it seems clear beyond cavil that
the waters that flooded the New Orleans East polder, which lies north of the MRGO
Canal and west of the intersection of the MRGO Canal and the Intercoastal Waterway,
came directly from Lake Borgne and indirectly from the Gulf of Mexico via the MRGO
Canal. The flooding of the polder to the south of the MRGO Canal and to the east of the
Industrial Canal resulted when waters flowing up the MRGO Canal overtopped the levees
along that canal and brought waters into interior of the polder. This flooding took place
before the eye of Hurricane Katrina passed to the east of the city and began to drive
waters from Lake Pontchartrain up the Industrial Canal and the outfall canals in the
downtown polder. It clearly did not result from waters entering Lake Pontchartrain from
Lake Borgne at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes. Had the barrier project been
constructed, the flooding of this area would still have occurred due to waters entering the
polder directly from Lake Borne and traveling up the MRGO Canal from Lake Borgne
and the Gulf of Mexico. It is even possible that the flooding of the New Orleans East
area would have been worse if the barrier plan had been implemented, given that more of
the surge would have been directed along these channels. Thus, hindsight causation
analysis strongly suggests that the lawsuit was not to blame for any of this flooding, and
few uncertainties cloud this analysis.
B. The Industrial Canal Levee Failures
Hindsight analysis offers a somewhat less certain answer to the question of
whether the overtopping of the levees on the west bank of the Industrial Canal would
have occurred had the Corps of Engineers not abandoned the barrier project. That project
was designed to reduce the chance that a storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain would
breach the levees along the lake and along the canals that open to that lake. It also
provided for a navigation lock, rock dike, and gated flood control structure where the
Industrial Canal enters Lake Pontchartrain. Had the barrier project been completed and
had it functioned properly (a topic addressed below), it would have added to the
protection of areas placed at risk from overtopping of the Industrial Canal levees to the
extent that the risk was attributable to waters from Lake Pontchartrain.
The engineers have agreed that the levees on the Industrial Canal were overtopped
and that the breaches probably occurred because waters that flowed over the levees
scoured out the soils behind those levees.103 Engineering analysis of the levees after the
flood, hindsight modeling, and the contemporaneous observations of the lockmaster all
converge on the conclusion that the waters that overtopped the levees in the Industrial
Canal came from Lake Borgne and points east, rather than from Lake Pontchartrain. The
fact that the Lake Pontchartrain storm surge did not overtop the levees bordering the
outlet canals during Hurricane Katrina further supports the conclusion that the levees
bordering the Industrial Canal, which parallels those canals, would not have been
overtopped in the absence of the larger storm surge that flowed up the MRGO Canal.
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The fact that the storm surge that flowed up the MRGO Canal did overtop the levees
bordering that canal suggests that the MRGO surge had the capacity to overtop the levees
on the Industrial Canal as the surge proceeded westward. Finally, the fact that the
damaged portions of the levees along the west side of the Industrial Canal were directly
across from the point at which the MRGO Canal enters the Industrial Canal at right
angles is also consistent with the conclusion that the waters that overtopped the Industrial
Canal levees came from Lake Borgne and the east, and not from Lake Pontchartrain.
As discussed above, the barrier project would not have prevented the storm surge
that moved westward along the MRGO Canal. Indeed, had the gated flood control
structure at the entrance of the Industrial Canal to Lake Pontchartrain been closed as
envisioned in the barrier project, it could have exacerbated the effects of the storm surge
moving along the MRGO Canal when it arrived at the Industrial Canal by preventing
water from exiting the Industrial Canal into Lake Pontchartrain. It appears, therefore,
that the failure to build the barrier project did not cause the flooding that resulted from
the failure of the levees along the Industrial Canal. That conclusion cannot be stated as
confidently as the prior conclusion about the flooding that resulted from the failures of
the levees along the MRGO Canal, because the Industrial Canal was directly connected to
Lake Pontchartrain and the barrier project (had it functioned properly) would have
offered protection against waters from that lake. Moreover, it is still possible—though
not likely—that all of the preliminary analyses are wrong and that the contemporaneous
observations were mistaken.
C. The 17th Street and London Avenue Levee Failures
There is no dispute that the storm surge that caused the 17th Street and London
Avenue levee failures originated in Lake Pontchartrain. To the extent that the force of
the Lake Pontchartrain storm surge would have been reduced by the barrier project, some
or all of the downtown polder may not have flooded had it been completed prior to
Katrina. This is not a minor matter, because the greatest economic damage occurred in
the downtown polder, and it appears that the largest number of deaths also occurred in
that polder.104 Even if Save Our Wetlands did not cause all of the flooding in the New
Orleans area, the claim that it caused the flooding of the downtown polder alone is an
extremely serious one that bears careful analysis.
Several large uncertainties, however, complicate but-for causal analysis of the
connection between Save Our Wetlands and the flooding of the downtown polder. First,
the storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain did not overtop the levees protecting the city
from the lake itself, and they were not breached. Moreover, all of the engineering reports
that have come to light thus far have concluded that the surge flowing from Lake
Pontchartrain up the outfall canals did not overtop the levees lining those canals. Like
the levees along the lake, those levees were designed to be of sufficient height to resist
overtopping from the SPH, and Katrina apparently did not generate a storm surge
exceeding that height. Most engineers have concluded that the levees along the 17th
Street and London Avenue outfall canals failed because the storm surge forced parts of
the floodwalls away from the canals and into the surrounding neighborhoods. The Lake
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Pontchartrain storm surge did not overwhelm those levees; it simply defeated them at
critical weak points. Although the engineering analysis is still clouded with considerable
uncertainty, it appears that those levees were either designed or constructed in a fashion
that prevented them from doing what they were supposed to do.105
This conclusion, however, does not necessarily lead directly to the ultimate
conclusion that the failure to construct the barrier project was not a but-for cause of the
flooding of the downtown polder. Even if it is true that a cause of the outfall canal levees
was improper design or improper construction, it is equally clear that neither of those
factors caused the levees to fail in the absence of the storm surge from Lake
Pontchartrain. More to the point, it is certainly possible that the storm surge in Lake
Pontchartrain would have been much less powerful had barrier gates at the Rigolets and
Chef Menteur passes been in place and closed before Katrina hit, such that the resulting
storm surge would have lacked sufficient force to breach the outfall canal levees even at
their weakest points. Viewed somewhat differently, the barrier project may have
provided a critical margin of safety for the overall system that would have prevented the
flooding of the downtown polder, allowing for the possibility that the outfall canals
would have been negligently constructed or maintained.
A proper hindsight analysis to test this hypothesis would have to estimate the
force of the storm surge in Lake Pontchartrain in a scenario during which the seagates at
the Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes had been properly designed and constructed and
had been properly closed prior to the time that the surge from Hurricane Katrina moved
from the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Borgne into Lake Pontchartrain. The outcome of this
analysis is by no means certain. For example, a spokesperson for the New Orleans
division of the Corps acknowledged after Hurricane Katrina that he was not sure “how
much [the barrier project] would have prevented anything.”106 Other reports suggest that
“Corps staff believe that flooding would have been worse if the original proposed design
had been built because the storm surge would likely have gone over the top of the barrier
and floodgates, flooded Lake Pontchartrain, and gone over the original lower levees
planned for the lakefront area as part of the barrier plan.”107
It is necessary to go beyond these statements, however, given that Army Corps
representatives have obvious reasons for discounting the likelihood that the barrier plan
would have performed better than the high level plan. A proper analysis of how the
barrier plan would have fared during Katrina would require a complex modeling exercise
that would in turn require the analyst to determine the height of the storm surge at the
passes and compare it to the design height of the levees and seagates. As noted
previously, the project was designed to withstand the SPH, which in New Orleans was
roughly equivalent to a fast-moving Category Three Hurricane.108 Although the media
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initially reported expert conclusions that Katrina was a Category Four Hurricane on the
Saffir-Simpson scale when the eye passed to the east of New Orleans,109 subsequent
analyses of the water levels along the levees have suggested that the storm may have
receded to Category Three status by the time the storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain hit
the city.110 The Saffir-Simpson scale, in any event, is based on wind speed and not
predicted storm surge levels, and in some circumstances it may be possible for a
Category Two storm to produce a storm surge that exceeds that of a Category Three
storm.111 Hence, even estimating the height of the storm surge at the Rigolets and Chef
Menteur passes is fraught with uncertainty.
If the storm surge would have exceeded the height of the levees and seagates
between Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne, then the surge would have entered the lake
at an attenuated level and probably at a lower velocity. This alone, however, would not
have prevented a surge in Lake Pontchartrain because the strong northeasterly winds
produced by the hurricane still would have caused water that was already in the lake to
surge against the levees protecting New Orleans. Some of that water would have surged
up the ungated outfall canals and that surge would have tested the levees. Whether the
seagates would have reduced the surge from Lake Pontchartrain sufficiently to prevent
the breach of poorly designed or constructed levees is therefore an exceedingly complex
question, the answer to which would require expertise in meteorology, hydrology,
engineering, mathematical modeling, and probably other disciplines. Certainly one
cannot conclude without a great deal of additional analysis that the barrier project as
conceived in the early 1970s—even if perfectly implemented and executed—would have
prevented the downtown polder from flooding during Hurricane Katrina.
Moreover, even if the analysts could confidently reach that conclusion, a proper
hindsight analysis also would need to take into account an alternative scenario in which
the barrier project was not properly implemented. If it is true, for example, that the high
level project was poorly implemented, there may be good reason to question whether the
barrier project would have been implemented as designed. A proper hindsight analysis
would therefore factor in the possibility that the levees running from the city to the
Rigolets and Chef Menteur passes or the seagates at the passes would have been
breached, just as the levees along the outfall canals were breached. It might also examine
the scenario in which the seagates were not properly closed in anticipation of the
hurricane: Given the numerous instances of official breakdown that occurred as Katrina
and its aftermath actually unfolded, such a possibility is not at all farfetched. In either
case, the storm surge flowing into Lake Pontchartrain from the Gulf of Mexico and Lake
Borgne would have been much larger, and the surge that moved up the outfall canals
might not have differed greatly from the surge that did in fact move up those canals
during Hurricane Katrina.
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The hindsight analysis would next have to examine the effect of Save Our
Wetlands on the Corps of Engineers’ decision not to build the barrier project. Some legal
analysts, including the United States Government Accountability Office, have concluded
that the Save Our Wetlands injunction should have delayed the barrier option only until
the Corps remedied the problems that the court had identified in the EIS.112 There is little
reason to believe that the court would not have lifted the injunction as soon as the Corps
of Engineers updated the EIS with adequate hydrological modeling (as requested by its
own chief engineer), conducted a more thorough biological assessment, and considered a
few reasonable alternatives. This may have delayed the completion of the project during
the time that it took for the Corps to finish this task and defend its product in court.
Although further hypothetical analysis would be required to determine whether this
would have delayed completion of the barriers past August 2005, there is little reason to
believe that completion would not have proceeded at least as quickly as the high level
project, which did not get started until 1985 but which was substantially completed by the
time that Hurricane Katrina hit.
Of course, the Corps of Engineers did not respond to the injunction by preparing
an adequate EIS for the barrier plan. Instead, it re-examined the mounting cost of the
barrier project in light of cost of the alternative high level project and decided to
implement the latter project. Thus, one could argue that the litigation caused the Corps to
rethink the alternatives in a manner that might not have occurred absent the litigationinduced pause to rethink.113 If the Corps would have forged ahead with the original
barrier project despite its increasing cost and despite strong local opposition, then the
lawsuit was indeed a but-for cause of the failure to implement the barrier project—albeit
only in an attenuated, happenstance way. The likelihood of even that scenario, moreover,
must be discounted by the probability that the Corps would have changed course at some
point anyway prior to completing the project, given the variety of other considerations
that began to weigh against the barrier plan.
D. From “But-For” to Blameworthiness
In a world of complexity and interconnection, any single event will be traceable to
innumerable but-for causes that led to the event’s occurrence.114 With respect to the
levee failures in New Orleans, for instance, potential causal contributors include not only
Save Our Wetlands, which is said to have led the Corps to adopt an inferior levee plan,
but also the local residents and officials who long opposed more robust protection plans
out of cost concerns.115 Additional contributors include the Corps officials who, after a
lengthy and unexplained delay, ultimately made the decision to switch from the barrier to
the high level plan; the contractors who allegedly implemented the high level plan with
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inadequate care; the land use planning officials whose decisions to permit massive
conversion of wetlands for development rendered New Orleans much more vulnerable to
storm surges regardless of which plan was adopted; the government officials who were
responsible for the Mississippi River flood protection system which also perversely made
New Orleans much more vulnerable to Gulf Coast storms; and perhaps even the
incalculable number of causal contributors to human-induced climate change which
might in theory have played a role in exacerbating Katrina’s intensity.116
Apportioning responsibility and fault among these many but-for causes requires
much more than simply empirical analysis and reconstruction. It requires an assignation
of blameworthiness according to moral, political, and legal criteria. For seemingly
opportunistic reasons, a number of officials and analysts have attempted to single out
Save Our Wetlands for particularly severe blameworthiness in the aftermath of Katrina.
If the preliminary engineering reports turn out to be correct, however, then the most
damaging flooding in the New Orleans area is attributable most obviously and directly to
the MRGO and to inadequate construction and maintenance of the 17th Street and
London Avenue levees, not to the design of the LPVHPP.117 Analysts who wish to pin
responsibility for the Katrina disaster on NEPA must therefore offer an account not only
of how Save Our Wetlands led to the adoption of the high level plan, but also how the
litigation led to malfeasance in the implementation of that plan. No serious effort has
been made to offer such an account, nor is it obvious how one could be constructed with
any degree of plausibility.
In the end, the only clear but-for consequence of Save Our Wetlands was a courtimposed moment of taking stock, a moment in which the Army Corps was asked to
reevaluate a long-troubled project in light of better information, changed circumstances,
and competing values—precisely the point of the NEPA procedure. The Corps
ultimately retained discretion to proceed with the barrier plan after conducting a proper
environmental impact assessment, and it certainly need not have waited nearly seven
years before deciding to abandon the barrier plan as it did.118 In short, one simply cannot
account for the Corps’ behavior by focusing on NEPA and Save Our Wetlands alone.
Instead, to appreciate why the Corps planning and implementation process for the
LPVHPP took the shape that it did, one must broaden the critical focus to include the
Congress, Army Corps leaders and staff, local residents and officials, scientific and
engineering experts, government contractors, local and national political interests, and a
variety of other key decisionmakers and influences. As the next Section describes, these
numerous forces combined in New Orleans to create a policymaking process that, at least
in hindsight, seems to have been especially handicapped in its ability to grapple with
long-term catastrophic potentialities—the very point of natural disaster policy.
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V. Lessons for Analysts from the Katrina Levee Debate
One obvious message of the forgoing discussion is that retrospective analysis of
cause and effect can be an exceedingly complex and uncertainty-laden exercise. The fact
that all of the relevant facts are in the past and can, at least in theory, be accurately
ascertained does not mean that retrospective analysis can avoid the speculation that is
inherent in prospective analysis: The counterfactual nature of the causation exercise
demands a similar task of projecting unknown states of the world in order to determine
what would have eventuated in the absence of the targeted causal factor. Hindsight
analysis of the Katrina disaster suggests that in a changing world, the farther removed the
analysis is in time from the event under inspection, the more difficult it will be to draw
confident conclusions about cause and effect. Failing memories and lost documentation
can, of course, hinder attempts to reconstruct past histories. In addition, intervening
events can greatly complicate the construction and analysis of counterfactual scenarios.
The more relevant intervening events that are possible, the more the counterfactual
narrative will become clouded by uncertainties.
In short, as one moves farther away from the available data—whether in terms
simply of time, or of the number of additional variables or intervening events—the risk
increases that one’s conclusions will be based on undefended modeling assumptions
rather than on actual empirical evidence.119 The NEPA Task Force, many of whose
members have expressed a strong desire to reduce NEPA’s procedural requirements,
seems to have fallen prey to just such an undefended assumption in its haste to attribute
the Katrina levee failures to NEPA litigation. Hindsight analysis of the Katrina disaster
offers no support at all for legislative action aimed at repealing or amending NEPA to
reduce the incidence of judicial intervention into Executive Branch activities under that
statute. As discussed above, the causal analysis that leads from a 1976 injunction
pending the preparation of an adequate EIS to the flooding of the downtown polder in
2005 is so laden with uncertainty, and so dependant on unsupported speculation, that it
simply cannot provide a rational justification for an action as momentous as overhauling
one of modern federal environmental law’s keystone statutes.
Nevertheless, as this Section describes, the history of the LPVHPP planning
process does offer some reliable lessons regarding the challenge of natural disaster
policymaking, lessons that should guide analysts as they consider post-Katrina hurricane
protection for New Orleans and other projects that guard against long-term, lowprobability, high-consequence events. The rather pessimistic conclusion reached above
regarding our powers of accurate, comprehensive hindsight analysis is likewise
applicable to our predictive analysis of future consequences of government interventions.
The systems that drive the incidence and severity of disaster consequences—whether in
the form of natural systems that give rise to extreme weather and geological events, or of
socioeconomic systems that determine in part how deadly and costly the consequences of
such events will be—are characterized by enormous complexity and uncertainty. What
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often will be required in disaster planning, therefore, is collective judgment regarding the
degree of moral and political commitment that citizens desire to express, both to their
fellow citizens within the present generation and to the generations to come, through
public prevention and mitigation projects that may have highly uncertain long-term
payoffs. As this Section describes, through familiar tools of risk assessment and policy
analysis, the LPVHPP planning process seems to have inadvertently obscured the need
for precisely that brand of judgment.
A. The Standard Project Hurricane
In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many commentators assumed
that New Orleans had finally outrun its luck. As noted above, initial reports suggested
that Katrina made landfall as a storm with a severity and a path that numerous experts
repeatedly had warned would someday strike the city with catastrophic results, a storm
that simply overwhelmed the design standard of the LPVHPP and other New Orleans
area levee systems.120 At least at this stage, however, engineering reports point instead to
a failure of implementation, such that it is quite possible that Katrina would not have
overwhelmed the New Orleans levees had they been constructed and maintained
properly. Still, this more mundane and lamentable explanation of the Katrina levee
failure does not obviate the need to look closely at the levee design process for evidence
of significant failures in our thinking about long-term catastrophic risks. Unfortunately,
the many pre-Katrina warnings that seemed so prophetic in the storm’s immediate
aftermath remain urgently relevant today, both to the post-Katrina reconstruction process
and to the challenge of natural disaster policy more generally.
At the heart of the LPVHPP and most other Army Corps hurricane protection
projects since the 1960s has been a technical model known as the standard project
hurricane (SPH).121 Because development of this model preceded the Saffir-Simpson
hurricane scale, attempts to describe the design standard of the LPVHPP in the wake of
Katrina have been somewhat confused. Depending on whether one is referring to
barometric pressure, radius, wind speed, or other critical storm characteristics, the SPH
can vary from a Category Two to Four storm on the now more familiar Saffir-Simpson
scale122 (although most commentators have been describing the SPH as “roughly
equivalent” to a fast moving Category Three storm). Nor does the SPH translate
smoothly into the conventional return period approach of describing storms in relation to
their expected interval of occurrence. Again, analysts have been describing the SPH as
“roughly equivalent” to the worst storm that could be expected every 200 to 300 years,123
although in actuality the SPH bears no direct relationship to such return-period or
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frequency intervals. As the National Weather Service stated in a 1972 technical
memorandum, “the standard project hurricane has no frequency assigned to it.”124
The SPH was developed by the Corps of Engineers at the request of Congress in
the 1950s “to provide generalized hurricane specifications that are consistent
geographically and meteorologically for use in planning, evaluating, and establishing
hurricane design criteria for hurricane protection works.”125 In conjunction with the U.S.
Weather Bureau, the Corps compiled data on all tropical storms of hurricane intensity
within specific geographic zones over the period from 1900 to 1956.126 Using this data,
the agencies created an index representing “the most severe combination of hurricane
parameters that is reasonably characteristic of a specified geographical region, excluding
extremely rare combinations.”127 Specifically, central barometric pressure was used as
the main estimation characteristic to generate a hypothetical or model storm for project
planning with respect to any given geographic area. Although the original SPH model
used a 100-year return period to identify the key central pressure measure for a given
area,128 the resulting model hurricane did not, strictly speaking, represent a 100-year
storm.
Instead, the 100-year pressure low was interpolated with other storm
characteristics such as storm radius, wind speed, forward speed, and storm direction to
generate “the most severe conditions . . . that are within the parameters of the SPH
indices . . . for [a particular] location,”129 a procedure that results in SPH storms of
varying frequency depending on location-specific criteria.
Initially, an overriding goal of the SPH appears to have been simply a desire to
compare hurricane protection standards from region to region: “The standard project
hurricane wind field and parameters represent a ‘standard’ against which the degree of
protection finally selected for a hurricane protection project may be judged and compared
with protection provided at projects in other localities.”130 This standardized approach,
however, led to disparities within particular localities. Different parts of the New Orleans
area, for instance, are at higher risk from hurricanes than others. Because suburban areas
124

National Weather Service, Preliminary Revised Standard Project Hurricane Criteria for the
Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the United States, Memorandum HUR 7-120, June 1972.
125
National Hurricane Research Project, Howard E. Graham & Dwight E. Nunn, Meteorological
Considerations Pertinent to Standard Project Hurricane, Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the United States,
Report No. 33 (1959). For a non-technical overview of the standard project hurricane and related
engineering issues, see JJ. Westerink & R.A. Leuttich, The Creeping Storm, Civil Engineering Magazine
(June 2003).
126
National Hurricane Research Project, Howard E. Graham & Dwight E. Nunn, Meteorological
Considerations Pertinent to Standard Project Hurricane, Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the United States,
Report No. 33 (1959).
127
Perdikis, supra note __, at 9.
128
National Hurricane Research Project, Howard E. Graham & Dwight E. Nunn, Meteorological
Considerations Pertinent to Standard Project Hurricane, Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the United States,
Report No. 33 (1959).
129
National Hurricane Research Project, Howard E. Graham & Dwight E. Nunn, Meteorological
Considerations Pertinent to Standard Project Hurricane, Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the United States,
Report No. 33 (1959).
130
National Hurricane Research Project, Howard E. Graham & Dwight E. Nunn, Meteorological
Considerations Pertinent to Standard Project Hurricane, Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the United States,
Report No. 33 at 2 (1959). See also (describing the SPH as being developed “to provide generalized
hurricane specifications that are consistent geographically and meteorologically for use in planning,
evaluating, and establishing hurricane design criteria for hurricane protection works”).

27

across the Mississippi river from New Orleans are not at risk from Lake Pontchartrain,
they face a 1 in 500 risk of flooding from a storm surge in a given year, whereas the
downtown polder fronting the lake faced a 1 in 300 risk just prior to Hurricane Katrina.
Likewise, the areas in the two polders to the east of the Industrial Canal, which were at
risk from a storm surge flowing up the MRGO Canal, faced an annual risk of between 1
in 200 (according to the Corps analysis) and 1 in 100 (according to an analysis
undertaken by a former Corps engineer who is now a private consultant).
The Corp’s chief engineer for the New Orleans district, Al Naomi, questions the
Corp’s authority to take these varying risk levels into account in planning for future storm
protections. In his view, Congress has mandated that all areas in the entire region be
protected from the same model storm. Thus, the levees in place throughout the city prior
to Hurricane Katrina were designed to withstand a storm surge of 11.5 feet, ignoring the
fact that some areas in the region are likely to encounter storm surges of that magnitude
much more frequently than others. As discussed above, the Berkeley/ASCE study
concluded that the storm surge along the MRGO Canal exceeded the levees by as much
as 10–15 feet, even though the storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain did not overtop any
of the levees in the downtown polder.131 Building higher levees in the areas that are, for
geographical reasons, subject to more frequent storm surges would, according to Naomi,
violate the Corp’s legal mandate. In his view, Congress would have to authorize such
variation specifically in legislation before the Corps could take it into account in
designing future levees.132
Deciding how to define and implement equity concerns within the natural disaster
context is a daunting task.133 Should regulators seek to equalize the probabilistic risk that
individuals face, or the amount of public money spent on protection per individual? To
what extent should the seemingly voluntary choices of individuals to live in particularly
vulnerable areas factor into the public policy assessment? How should disaster planning
take account of the socioeconomic differences between, say, Trent Lott, whose historic
oceanfront home in Mississippi was destroyed by Katrina, and the thousands of povertystricken New Orleans residents whose homes also were known to be located in areas of
great vulnerability?134 These are vital moral and political questions that currently receive
little attention from the Corps or from Congress, perhaps in part because the SPH
provides an unwarranted sense that relevant geographical variations already have been
“accounted for.”135
Over time, moreover, the SPH seems to have acquired an even stronger
presumption of normativity, being described frequently in Corps documents and other
proceedings as the most severe storm that the government “reasonably” or “practicably”
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should guard against when designing hurricane protection projects. Thus, the SPH came
to represent not only a method for comparative assessment of storm risks across
geographic areas, but also a design standard that carries its own implicit assurance of
optimality:
•

“The SPH is intended as a practicable expression of the maximum degree of
protection that should be sought as a general rule in planning and design of
coastal structures for communities where protection of human life and destruction
of property is involved.”136

•

“An SPH is one that may be expected from the most severe combination of
meteorological conditions that are considered reasonably characteristic in the
region.”137

•

“The project has been designed to afford complete protection from the occurrence
of the largest probable storm (SPH) that can reasonably be expected in the region.
… Probability of occurrence of hurricanes having a greater magnitude than the
SPH are too remote to warrant practical consideration.”138

•

“The project is designed to protect against the ‘standard project hurricane’
moving on the most critical track. Only a combination of hydrologic and
meteorologic circumstances anomalous to the region could produce higher stages.
The probability of such a combination occurring is, for all practical purposes,
nil.”139

•

“[The SPH] was expected to have a frequency of occurrence of once in about 200
years, and represented the most severe combination of meteorological conditions
considered reasonably characteristic for the region.”140

•

“To identify a level of risk a given area faces, we do an engineering and an
economic analysis and come to an optimum solution for a level of protection.”141
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By tracing the SPH back to its origins, however, one finds strong basis for
doubting the wisdom of this gradual normative reification of the design standard. To
begin with, the SPH is obviously only as reliable as the data it is built upon. The original
SPH model, which appeared in National Hurricane Research Program Report No. 33 in
1959, was built using data on all Atlantic tropical storms from 1900 to 1956 that reached
hurricane intensity at some point during their lifetimes. As the authors of the 1959 report
acknowledged, much of the data used was unreliable given the great imprecision of the
available measurement technology. In particular, for much of the data the researchers
had to extrapolate from land-based measurements in order to determine an estimate for
off-shore storm pressure, because it was not until later in the twentieth century that
scientists began using aircraft to measure storm pressure offshore.
Even assuming valid measurements, however, the 57 year record was quite
limited in scope—containing only 22 storms in total for Zone B, the geographic area that
corresponded to New Orleans—and was obviously insufficient to generate a statistically
significant rendering of the overall distribution of potential storms from a multi-century
perspective.142 The researchers attempted to extrapolate from the existing data by, first,
calculating the cumulative number of storms that had appeared during the observation
period at or below various levels of pressure (see figure 3). This measure was then
converted to a 100 year index simply by linearly stretching the data out from 56 to 100
years. Finally, the data were plotted on normal distribution graph paper with the idea
that, if the observed data appeared to fall into a straight line, then one could conclude that
hurricane frequency follows a normal distribution and, therefore, that extrapolationg to
longer return periods could be accomplished simply by following the observed trend line
(see figure 4).
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Figure 3

Figure 4

There may be reason to doubt these assumptions. Looking at Zone A—which
included Florida and areas east of New Orleans (see figure 5)—one observes that, in
addition to the much sharper slope of the pressure data, at least one recorded storm lies
far outside the normal distribution trend. Of course, that is just one storm and it is very
difficult to say whether it represents a 100, 500, or 10,000 year storm. But that is
precisely the point: With such a small sample, there is really not much empirically
supporting the assumption that storm intensity will follow a normal distribution. Instead,
the decision to extrapolate linearly is one that depended on a relatively unexamined
conviction that Gulf storm behavior follows the tidy world of classical mathematics. It
may well, of course, but it may also represent what Dan Farber has called the world of
“probabilities behaving badly,” a world in which complex, adaptive systems are
characterized not by normal probability distributions, but by power law distributions in
which extreme events appear with a surprising regularity.143
Figure 5
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Along those lines, consider a few facts from the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season:
•

Twenty-seven Atlantic storms were named during 2005, the most on record,
shattering the previous record of 21 from 1933. For the first time, meteorologists
had to reach into the Greek alphabet for additional storm names.

•

Fifteen hurricanes were observed, breaking the old record of 12 set in 1969.

•

The most category 5 storms ever recorded in one season (Katrina, Rita, and
Wilma).

•

Wilma became the strongest hurricane on record in the Atlantic basin, as
measured by barometric pressure. Three of the six strongest hurricanes on record
occurred in 2005.

•

Hurricane Katrina made landfall with wind speeds of 125 mph and a minimum
central pressure of 27.13 inches, the third lowest on record at landfall behind
Hurricane Camille from 1969 and the Labor Day Hurricane that struck the Florida
Keys in 1935.144

•

Katrina was the costliest U.S. hurricane on record. In addition, the overall season
tally for damage was the costliest in U.S. history.
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•

Hurricane Vince became the first known instance of a tropical cyclone making
landfall in Spain.

•

Hurricane Delta became only the sixth hurricane on record in December since
1851.

•

Tropical cyclone Zeta became the longest-lived tropical cyclone ever recorded in
January.

A critical question facing disaster planners going forward is whether the classical
scientific assumption of normal distributions and predictable, linear biophysical behavior
is appropriate in a world of complexity and climate change. Even putting aside these
problems of model uncertainty,145 however, one still faces the basic decision of how
conservative to be in setting the benchmark for the SPH. The 1959 researchers focused
on central barometric pressure and constructed a table reflecting the lowest central
pressure index that one would expect at various geographic locations with an annual
probability of 1%. In other words, they chose the 100 year return period for central
pressure, as estimated using their admittedly limited data sample and their contestable
extrapolation technique. Figure 6 shows the resulting values at various geographic
locations throughout the Gulf. For New Orleans, the 100 year estimate was 27.60 inches.
Again, the SPH was not equivalent to a 100 year storm, because central pressure was then
interpolated with other variables in a way that tended to make the SPH more severe at
any given point than a 100 year storm. How much more, however, is hard to say because
the SPH depends on location specific combinations of these variables. That is why the
New Orleans levee system was frequently described as having been designed to guard
against something like a 200 to 300 year storm.
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Figure 6

Still, why anchor on a 100 year central pressure index, rather than 500 or 10,000
years? As the Corps noted in its 1972 revision of the SPH, this decision to hinge
determination of the SPH on a 100-year central pressure index return period was
essentially an “arbitrary” one when considered from the scientific perspective.146 This is
not to say that the original analysts were unjustified in choosing a 100-year return period
for central pressure or that some other period was obviously more appropriate. It is
simply to say that the question was not a purely technical one.147 One can find clues as to
those non-technical considerations in contemporaneous descriptions of the SPH model,
where commentators describe the model as being used to project the worst storm that is
“economically reasonable” to guard against.148 In fact, some Corps economists at the
time believed that the SPH was too cautious, and that a less severe storm should be used
as the benchmark for disaster planning and prevention.
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This murky blending of science and policy continued in the much more elaborate
and technical 1979 overhaul of the SPH . In this report, the SPH was changed so that the
critical pressure parameter was derived not from the 100 year lowest expected pressure,
but from the average of the seven lowest actually observed storms (see figure 7).
Figure 7

This procedure may seem to be an improvement over the arbitrary selection of a
100 year low, but it still begs the question, why not take the lowest 5 storms, or the single
lowest storm, or even the single lowest storm with an additional safety margin included?
In fact, the researchers did something quite the oppositein that they excluded the two
worst observed storms from their seven lowest storm index: Hurricane Camille from
1969, and the Labor Day storm of 1933. The reasons provided for this exclusion are
somewhat obscure in the report: “Our decision was based on the idea that these two
hurricanes contained extremely low po’s resulting in sustained wind speeds that were not
reasonably characteristic of the northern gulf coast and the Florida Keys.”149
To be sure, excluding outlier data is standard practice for much statistical
analysis, yet the move seems inappropriate in the context of natural disaster planning.
The extreme tails of a distribution in this context may be precisely the areas of most
149

Richard W. Schwert et al., Meteorological Criteria for Standard Project Hurricane and Problem
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large region have had more extreme values of the meteorological parameters.”)..
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interest and concern.150 After all, the two storms excluded—Camille and the Labor Day
storm—were the only two on record with a lower central pressure than Katrina. The
subjective nature of the data-trimming judgment is implicitly acknowledged elsewhere in
the technical report, when the analysts recommend use of an alternative, much more
conservative measure—the probable maximum hurricane—for disaster planning “in
locations where high winds, waves and storm surge could pose a threat to the public
health and safety from a hurricane-induced accident at a nuclear power plant.”151 Why
not use this higher standard of protection for projects that do not involve nuclear power
plants? As one observer noted, “[t]he design of structures to provide protection against
the probable maximum hurricane would, in most locations, be economically
unjustified.”152 Thus, loaded into the SPH model again is an implicit cost-benefit
calculation, one that prevents policymakers from asking directly whether an extreme
event is worth guarding against simply by excluding the possibility that such an event
will occur.
Marshalling support for current public investment in long-term disaster
prevention and mitigation projects is a political challenge of the highest magnitude. As
Kenneth Boulding once wryly noted, “it seems very hard to organize a long-run crisis.”153
Given this difficulty, one advantage of the conventional return period approach to
describing flood and storm protection projects is its ready accessibility to non-expert
audiences.154 For instance, when the Dutch suffered a devastating storm in 1953 that
killed 2,000 people, the nation embarked on a 30-year plan to protect the country against
the worst storm that could be expected in 10,000 years.155 Similarly, when a massive
Mississippi River flood in 1927 killed several hundred individuals, displaced over five
hundred thousand, and destroyed property worth some $3 billion (1993 dollars),156
Congress and the Corps developed an especially robust Mississippi River flood
protection system that was designed to withstand an 800-year flood, some five hundred
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years more forward-looking than the LPVHPP.157 By most reports, the Mississippi River
system performed extremely well during Hurricane Katrina despite storm surges that
reached 15 to 20 feet along river stretches below New Orleans.158
Did the relative opacity of the SPH prevent the development of political support
for a more robust hurricane protection system along the lines of the Mississippi River
system? Almost certainly not. As the GAO reported in 1982, state and local sponsors in
New Orleans repeatedly “recommended that the Corps lower its design standards to
provide more realistic hurricane protection to withstand a hurricane whose intensity
might occur once every 100 years rather than building a project to withstand a once in
200- to 300-year occurrence.”159 Still, over time, more widely comprehensible protection
standards might help to overcome the apparent reluctance of political constituencies to
support long-term, intergenerational disaster planning. Currently, the Association of
State Floodplain Managers advocates a 500 year storm level of protection for urban areas
and critical facilities.160 The wisdom of such a standard depends in part on technical
engineering and economic factors, but it also depends critically on the public’s attitude
toward risk, uncertainty, and intergenerational obligation. Rather than highlight such
concerns for public scrutiny and deliberation, the SPH seems to have buried them within
a confidently-expressed, but ultimately illusory assurance of “reasonableness” and
“optimality.”
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Since the Flood Control Act of 1936, Army Corps of Engineers project funding
has been limited by Congress to those projects that have demonstrated benefits in excess
of costs.161 This early form of regulatory cost-benefit analysis was not originally
associated with a perceived need for agency discipline, as it is today, but rather with a
conviction that science, empiricism, and expert judgment could lead to wise
policymaking.162 Over time, such New Deal optimism became replaced by a more
skeptical view of government, and the Army Corps in particular seemed to attract
scrutiny from interests all along the political spectrum who began to view the statutory
cost-benefit requirement as a valuable check on the otherwise overreaching impulses of
the Corps. In part for reasons such as this, a number of prominent scholars and officials
157
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today regard the use of formal cost-benefit analysis to be of critical importance to the
future of environmental, health, and safety regulation.163
The history of the LPVHPP planning process, however, suggests that the costbenefit requirement may have had undesirable distortionary effects on Corps
decisionmaking. A report in the Washington Post, for instance, claimed that the critical
normative judgments described above regarding the construction of the SPH were driven
in part by concern that the cost-benefit constraint facing Corps’ projects would not justify
higher levels of storm protection.164 In fact, an Army Corps official in 1978 reported that
economic cost-benefit analyses at the time were prescribing an even lower level of
protection than the SPH.165 No doubt these economic conclusions were driven in part by
the standard use of a 3.25 percent discount rate in evaluating monetized projects costs
and benefits,166 a procedure that scholars have shown to reflect a clumsy and inadequate
way of addressing questions of intergenerational equity, particularly in the face of very
long-range planning of the sort implicated by disaster policy.167
163

See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L.
J. 165 (1999); Kenneth J. Arrow Et Al., Is There A Role For Cost-Benefit Analysis In Environmental,
Health, And Safety Regulation?, 272 Science 221 (1996); Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty
And The Evaluation Of Public Investment Decisions, 60 Am. Econ. Rev. 364, 366-67 (1970); Stephen
Breyer, Breaking The Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (1993); Richard A. Posner,
Catastrophe: Risk And Response (2004); Richard Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification
And Comment On Conference Papers, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1153 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Laws Of Fear:
Beyond The Precautionary Principle (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Risk & Reason: Safety, Law, And The
Environment (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State Ix (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition And
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1059 (2000).
164
“The Corps was required to recommend the project with the most economic benefits—no
matter who received them—compared to the cost to the taxpayers. It could not consider whether the
benefits would be fairly distributed, or the value of wetlands the project might destroy, or even the value of
protecting people from death. So the Corps settled on 200-year protection from storms, a sharp contrast to
the 800-year protection from the river.” Michael Grunwald & Susan B. Glasser, The Slow Drowning of
New Orleans, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 2005, at A01.
165
Hurricane Protection Plan for Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Jan. 5, 1978 Hearings (“Even
though economists may, and in this case did, favor protection to a lower scale to produce a higher ratio of
project benefits to project costs, the threat of loss of human life mandated using the standard project
hurricane.”) (testimony of J. Rush, District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans). See also
U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee
to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 89-90 (2006).
166
See U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans, Louisiana, Final Environmental Statement,
Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana, and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (August 1974).
167
See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing The Price Of
Everything And The Value Of Nothing (2004); Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural
Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 Boston College Envtl. Affairs L. Rev. 555 (2004);
Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental
Protection, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553, 1563 (2002); Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97
Northwestern Univ. L. Rev. 675 (2003); Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the
Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 Boston College L. Rev. 1, 28-36 (2001); Lisa Heinzerling,
Discounting Our Future, 34 Land & Water L. Rev. 39 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and
the Present Future, 87 Geo. L.J. 2025 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 Yale L.J. 1911
(1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L. J. 1981 (1998); Tyler
Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in Justice Between Age Groups And Generations
144 (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds., 1992); Richard B. Norgaard & Richard B. Howarth,
Sustainability and Discounting the Future, in Ecological Economics: The Science And Management Of
Sustainability 88, 97–98 (Robert Costanza ed., 1991).

38

It also bears noting that the Corps typically does not take potential loss of life into
account when conducting cost-benefit analyses of its projects. According to the GAO,
the Corps’ guidance (Engineer Regulation 1105-2-100) directs analysts to address the
issue of prevention of loss of life when evaluating alternative plans, but they are not
required to formally estimate the number of lives saved or lost as a potential effect of a
project.168 In situations where historical data exist, the analysts have the option to
estimate the number of persons potentially affected by a project and include this number
as an additional factor for the consideration of decision makers. Hence, a high cost
project that has few economic benefits, but which would save many lives, may not pass
the cost-benefit test since the Corps does not include the lives saved as an explicitly
monetized benefit.
In practice, this exclusion of saved human lives from cost-benefit calculation may
have contributed to the Corps’ apparent practice of liberally including prospects for
private development as part of its flood control and hurricane protection projects.
Because the Corps did not include saved human lives or ecological values in its costbenefit analyses, the bulk of the identified benefit from hurricane protection tended to
come from the safeguarding of real and personal property.169 Thus, in order to generate a
higher regulatory “budget” for project planning purposes, the Corps seems naturally to
have been tempted to design projects in ways that generated easily identifiable and
monetizable property protection benefits, even if that meant the earmarking of wetlands
for future development that might otherwise have remained in their natural, storm surge
dampening state.170 Indeed, a key aspect of the local opposition to the LPVHPP centered
on the question of whether the Corps had gone beyond protecting existing and anticipated
land developments to actively promoting new development that would not have occurred
but for the Corps’ activities.171 As one analyst noted, “[a]n extraordinary 79% [of the net
benefits from the LPVHPP] were to come from new development that would now be
feasible with the added protection provided by the improved levee system.”172
The use of cost-benefit analysis for purposes of environmental, health, and safety
regulation is, of course, highly controversial and a full treatment of the subject is well
beyond the scope of this Article. Even if the Corps had included human health and
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environmental values within its cost-benefit calculations, theoretically and normatively
difficult questions would have remained regarding how to monetize those values and how
to account for their inter-temporal distribution.173 What the Katrina planning process
more narrowly seems to show, however, is yet another way in which cost-benefit analysis
in practice leads to the very kinds of political and analytical distortions that the procedure
is designed to guard against. For example, some observers of the regulatory process
(including one of the authors of this article) have advocated greater use of retrospective
cost analysis as a check on what appear to be systematic overestimates of industry
regulatory compliance costs in prospective cost-benefit analysis—a distortion that leads
to unduly modest levels of investment in environmental, health, and safety regulation.174
Similarly, in the Katrina context, the failure to account adequately for the lifesaving
purposes of hurricane protection seems to have led the Corps not only to understate the
monetary justification for hurricane protection, but also to promote private land
development schemes that may well have been counterproductive from the perspective of
guarding against storm surges.
C. Priority Setting
The Corps is very reluctant to participate in the process of setting priorities for its
projects. Once the Corps has determined that the benefits of a proposed project exceed
its costs, the Corps leaves it to Congress to decide through the appropriations process
those projects that receive funding and those that do not.175 The Corps’ reluctance in this
regard is somewhat understandable, given the agency’s desire to appear to be a
politically-neutral, expert-driven body, rather than the self-aggrandizing pork processor it
often is depicted to be in more cynical political discussion.176 Yet the Corps’ relative
agnosticism on priorities deprives congressional decisionmakers of crucial contextual
information regarding the relative seriousness of proposed projects. As one observer
noted, “[s]aving New Orleans gets no more emphasis than draining wetlands to grow
corn and soybeans.”177
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The Corps’ agnosticism in this regard also encourages piecemeal, project-byproject congressional decisionmaking, when instead a more comprehensive approach is
required that integrates flood control, hurricane protection, coastal restoration, ecosystem
preservation, and mitigation projects within a single framework. The much-criticized
MRGO Canal, for instance, might have appeared to be a far less attractive project had it
been analyzed as part of a more direct and inclusive effort to balance economic
development with human safety and the environment. As Professor Oliver Houck has
noted, the MRGO costs taxpayers thousands of dollars per ship passing while it has
destroyed 26,000 acres of cypress hardwood and marsh. As a result, “environmentalists
have been trying to get [it] closed for 25 years.”178 Thus, for a variety of reasons beyond
just its potentially risk-enhancing qualities with respect to hurricanes, the MRGO seems
to represent indefensible public policy. The full egregiousness of the project, however, is
difficult to perceive when its implications are analyzed only in a piecemeal fashion.
Moreover, the polder containing the Ninth Ward and parts of St. Bernard Parish
that flooded during Hurricane Katrina also was inundated in 1965 during Hurricane
Betsy, a fast moving CategoryThree hurricane. Officials at the time suggested that the
MRGO Canal had acted like a funnel, channeling the storm surge from the Gulf of
Mexico into New Orleans.179 A Times-Picayune article in 2002 later noted that
“proponents of closing and filling in MRGO say it has evolved into a shotgun pointed
straight at New Orleans, should a major hurricane approach from that angle.”180 Levee
analysis and sophisticated modeling exercises have led some experts to conclude that this
very shotgun fired during Hurricane Katrina, with devastating results.181 While it is
certainly possible that the polder would have flooded even if the MRGO Canal had not
existed in 1965 and again in 2005, policymakers could reasonably conclude that filling in
the MRGO Canal now would eliminate a potential cause of future flooding.182
In order to appreciate these multidimensional implications of the MRGO Canal,
one must move beyond narrowly framed modes of policy analysis and embrace
something more like the emerging sustainable development paradigm, in which the many
determinants of human well-being and environmental sustainability are treated as aspects
178
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of a single complex, but integrated public policy framework.183 It makes little sense, for
instance, to talk about the optimal post-Katrina hurricane protection plan for New
Orleans without also discussing wetlands, housing and transportation, climate change and
energy, and a host of other policy areas that undoubtedly and significantly will impact the
very parameters that also guide hurricane protection planning. Such decisionmaking will
not lend itself to formulaic resolution. It is necessarily pluralistic and messy, yet it is
apparently the only way that disasters such as Katrina can be anticipated and avoided in
an increasingly intertwined and fragile world.

VI. Conclusion
Familiar aphorisms aside, hindsight is not necessarily 20/20: The counterfactual
nature of the hindsight causation analysis inevitably requires the analyst to create a
hypothetical world in which alternatives are chosen that were not in fact adopted in the
real world. As with the related “cause-in-fact” inquiry in tort law, this inquiry invites a
great deal of speculation. When the suggested cause of a catastrophic failure is remote in
time and when many other actions that are also relevant to the causal analysis intervene
or could have intervened between the suggested cause and the failure, the opportunity for
analysts to speculate—or manipulate—becomes very real. Accordingly, how we sort
among many uncertain counterfactual worlds to identify responsible causal agents says as
much about our politics and our culture as it does about our science.184
In that respect, recent attempts by politicians and pundits to pin the levee failure
in New Orleans on NEPA litigation do not speak well of our politics and our culture.
Hindsight analysis provides little reason to believe that a barrier project of the sort
envisioned in 1976 would have prevented the Hurricane Katrina storm surge from
breaching the levees along the 17th Street and London Avenue canals, as recent critics of
NEPA have argued. Looking forward, policymakers are well advised to examine what
exactly caused the levees along the outfall canals to fail, taking action to rebuild or fortify
those levees prior to investing in an expensive barrier project. Once that remedial work is
accomplished, a more expansive barrier project may still be warranted, and it may even
need to be substantially more protective than the project envisioned in 1976, including a
seagate at the point at which the MRGO Canal intersects with the Intercoastal Waterway
to provide equitable levels of protection to New Orleans East and St. Bernard Parish.185
Any such project, however, should only be contemplated with the same commitment to
integrated, environmentally-informed decisionmaking that has characterized NEPA since
its adoption in 1969.
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According to some estimates, a coastal protection system capable of guarding
against a Category Four to Five storm for New Orleans would cost $2.5 billion and
require 10 to 20 years of construction.186 As hindsight analysis of the LPVHPP planning
process shows, deciding whether to undertake such a project can never be reduced
entirely to a technocratic exercise. Just as judgment and discretion inhere in the
attribution of fault for a causally overdetermined disaster, so too does the prediction of
harm from inherently complex and uncertain systems always require the exercise of
collective agency and responsibility. To be sure, the tools of risk assessment and costbenefit analysis do provide vital information for public policymaking. They must,
however, be deployed with a degree of sensitivity regarding their limitations and a
vigilant awareness of the need for moral and political judgments that go beyond the
parameters of the formalized analytical frameworks.
The LPVHPP planning process suggests that such sensitivity and awareness may
have been placed in jeopardy by overzealous confidence in the powers of technical
decisionmaking apparatuses.187 In the case of the SPH, a sophisticated meteorological
model tended to obscure important decisions regarding the treatment of highly uncertain
but potentially catastrophic risks to present and future New Orleans residents, suggesting
a degree of normative agreement lurking behind the concept of “reasonably
characteristic” hurricanes that was almost certainly absent in actuality. In the case of
cost-benefit analysis, the Corps’ approach to economic project evaluation seemed both to
stack the deck against long-range investment in disaster prevention and mitigation, and to
promote a form of “mission creep” in the Corps planning activities toward easily
monetizable benefits.
In sum, neither the blame game nor the numbers game is up to the task of
formulating sound and ethical natural disaster policy. Instead, analysts should set out the
uncertainties of both hindsight and prospective analyses in a way that is easily accessible
to decisionmakers and the public, so that the full challenge of long-term intergenerational
risk regulation will be highlighted for consideration, rather than obscured from view.
Focusing narrowly on any single parameter of complex natural and human systems is
likely to dramatically distort environmental, health, and safety decisionmaking—whether
the parameter is a “standard project hurricane” when we are planning a hurricane
protection plan, or the equally mythical “lawsuit that sunk New Orleans” when we are
attempting to allocate responsibility for a disaster some forty years later.
_______
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CRS Report, New Orleans Levees and Floodwalls: Hurricane Damage Protection, Sept. 6,
2005. These estimates are likely vastly optimistic. See Peter Whoriskey & Spencer S. Shu, Levee Repair
Costs Triple, Washington Post, March 31, 2006, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/03/30/AR2006033001912.html?nav=rss_email/components (noting that the Bush
Administration had raised cost estimates for rebuilding the New Orleans levee system to “federal
standards” to $10 billion in light of better understanding of wetlands loss, subsidence, and hurricane
frequency and intensity).
187
Porter, supra note __, at 7-8 (“Quantitative estimates sometimes are given considerable weight
when nobody defends their validity with real conviction . . . Quantification is a way of making decisions
without seeming to decide. Objectivity lends authority to officials who have little of their own.”).
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